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Limited capacity to lie: Cognitive load interferes with being
dishonest
Anna E. van ’t Veer∗ Mariëlle Stel† Ilja van Beest†
Abstract
The current study tested the boundary conditions of ethical decision-making by increasing cognitive load. This manip-
ulation is believed to hinder deliberation, and, as we argue, reduces the cognitive capacity needed for a self-serving bias
to occur. As telling a lie is believed to be more cognitively taxing than telling the truth, we hypothesized that participants
would be more honest under high cognitive load than low cognitive load. 173 participants anonymously rolled a die three
times and reported their outcomes — of which one of the rolls would be paid out — while either under high or low
cognitive load. For the roll that determined pay, participants under low cognitive load, but not under high cognitive load,
reported die rolls that were significantly different from a uniform (honest) distribution. The reported outcome of this roll
was also significantly higher in the low load condition than in the high load condition, suggesting that participants in the
low load condition lied to get higher pay. This pattern was not observed for the second and third roll where participants
knew the rolls were not going to be paid out and where therefore lying would not serve self-interest. Results thus indi-
cate that having limited cognitive capacity will unveil a tendency to be honest in a situation where having more cognitive
capacity would have enabled one to serve self-interest by lying.
Keywords: deception, cognitive processing capacity, morality, dual system, decision-making.
1 Introduction
Deception — intentionally misleading another person —
is an omnipresent phenomenon that at times can greatly fa-
cilitate social interaction, but at other times can cause im-
mense harm, pain and have grave financial consequences.
Telling a lie often comes with justifications and with bi-
ases that permit people to lie (e.g., a self-serving bias) that
likely happen out of conscious awareness. Yet, arguably,
even these biases may take up some cognitive capacity.
Here we test whether the decision to tell a lie is born out
of our intuitive, automatic tendency to do so or whether
this unethical behavior is a result of more effortful cogni-
tive processing. We do so by manipulating the availability
of processing resources in an anonymous, tempting situ-
ation where dishonest behavior is typically observed. In
other words, we test whether having a limited cognitive
processing capacity makes people more honest than when
they do have processing resources available.
Thus far, research on social decision-making has made
use of a framework that divides the decision process into
two systems (i.e., a dual-system framework; e.g., Evans,
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2003; Haidt, 2001; Kahneman, 2011, but see Keren &
Schul, 2009, for a critical evaluation). When making a
decision, people are believed to rely both on automatic,
sometimes called intuitive, processes, and more delibera-
tive or controlled processes. In the case of moral decision-
making, this dual-system framework has left researchers
with evidence pointing in opposite directions. On the one
hand, some have argued people have an intuitive sense to
be prosocial and ethical. For instance, Rand, Greene, and
Nowak (2012) find in several studies that people are in-
tuitively cooperative. Some of these findings, however,
have recently been questioned by Tinghög and colleagues
(2013). The issues raised seem to center mainly around
the studies using time pressure to bring about an auto-
matic response, but not around other manipulations used,
like inducing an intuitive mindset. Using methods to elicit
intuitive decision making, Zhong (2011) also found intu-
ition decreased the use of deception and increased altru-
ism, strengthening to the notion the people are intuitively
prosocial. On the other hand, others have argued that it
takes deliberation to decide to do the right thing, as it was
found that people’s response under time-pressure was to
be dishonest (Shalvi, Eldar, & Bereby-Meyer, 2012) and
that contemplation leads to more ethical decisions (Gunia,
Wang, Huang, Wang, & Murnighan, 2012). Findings from
studies investigating unethical behavior — and especially
those investigating deception — thus paint an inconsistent
picture.
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A broad range of findings suggests that deception is
cognitively taxing. First, evidence from evolutionary
(Byrne & Corp, 2004) and developmental (Hala & Rus-
sell, 2001) research suggests deception involves complex
cognitive processes. Second, relative to truthful respond-
ing, lying shows an increase in response time (Farrow et
al., 2003; Spence et al., 2001) and an increase in cogni-
tive effort as measured by pupil dilation (Wang, Spezio,
& Camerer, 2010). Neuroimaging studies typically find
lies elicit more activation in the brain than truths (Ganis,
Kosslyn, Stose, Thompson, & Yurgelun-Todd, 2003; Lan-
gleben et al., 2002; Lee et al., 2009), and consider the
truth the “baseline” (Spence et al., 2004). Third, in the
lie-detection literature, telling a lie is assumed to be more
cognitively taxing: One has to make up a story, tell it
coherently, monitor ones own and the other persons’ de-
meanor, and, arguably, regulate ones feelings about being
unethical at the same time (Vrij et al., 2008; Zuckerman,
Depaulo, & Rosenthal, 1981). Fourth, a process of justi-
fying dishonest behavior is likely to take place when there
is ample opportunity to do so (Shalvi, Dana, Handgraaf,
& De Dreu, 2011), assumingly in order to maintain a pos-
itive self-image (Mazar, Amir, & Ariely, 2008). Even this
kind of self-serving tendency, however widespread or un-
conscious, seems to take up some form of cognitive pro-
cessing. Given the evidence outlined above, we argue that
lying is cognitively taxing, and that it thus should not be
observed when cognitive capacity is unavailable.
However, a study in which participants had the opportu-
nity to lie to serve their self-interest indicated that partic-
ipants were more dishonest with time-pressure than with-
out it (Shalvi et al., 2012). Authors of this study inter-
preted this finding by suggesting that dishonesty is peo-
ple’s automatic tendency when self-interest can be served.
In reply, however, Foerster, Pfister, Schmidts, Dignath,
and Kunde (2013) noted that this finding might be due to
specifics in the procedure, namely that participants could
have decided on their response while apprehending the
task. Foerster et al. did not impose time-pressure but ma-
nipulated response time by asking their participants to re-
port an outcome of a die roll immediately, or after a short
delay. Their findings suggest that immediate responses are
more honest than delayed responses, and that these differ-
ences disappear when participants are more familiar with
the task due to doing it a second time. It could thus be the
case that the relationship between response time and hon-
esty is not linear, but that honesty depends on other factors
like the level of cognitive processing capacity that is avail-
able. We argue here that manipulating cognitive load is
better suited to further this debate. As imposing cognitive
load can effectively reduce the available processing capac-
ity, it can distinguish between responses that draw on more
or less processing resources.
As some experiments have demonstrated, individuals
under cognitive load have a more pronounced tendency to
respond in accordance with their automatic, affective in-
tuition. For instance, it leads people to choose chocolate
cake over fruit (Shiv & Fedorikhin, 1999). In the moral
judgment literature, cognitive load has been found to make
people less likely to make an utilitarian judgment (Tré-
molière, Neys, & Bonnefon, 2012) and respond slower
for this kind of controlled cognitive judgment (Greene,
Morelli, Lowenberg, Nystrom, & Cohen, 2008). Valdes-
olo and DeSteno (2008) saw the self-serving bias that is
typically observed in the hypocrisy literature disappear
when imposing their subjects to high cognitive load; these
subjects judged a moral transgression performed by them-
selves as unfair as when it was performed by another indi-
vidual, indicating they had no cognitive capacity to make
self-serving justifications under cognitive constraint. Sim-
ilarly, although lying might be a quick response, it could
still require some additional cognitive resources. On the
basis of this, and on the basis of the four previously men-
tioned arguments, we predict dishonesty to be reduced un-
der cognitive load.
To measure deceptive behavior we employ the “Die un-
der the cup” paradigm that has been used in similar re-
search settings (Fischbacher & Heusi, 2008; Shalvi et al.,
2011). In this paradigm, participants anonymously re-
port the outcome of their die roll for money — where a
higher outcome equals higher pay — giving them an in-
centive to lie. This paradigm does not allow assessment
of individual dishonesty, yet the distribution of reported
outcomes can be compared to a distribution expected by
chance, which would indicate no dishonesty. Conversely,
if more high numbers are reported than can be expected
by chance, this result indicates dishonesty. For our pur-
poses, a setting wherein participants report their first die
roll for payment and roll the die a second and third time
for no payment is especially appropriate. Under these cir-
cumstances — where desired numbers might be observed
on the second and third roll — it is found that people are
especially inclined to lie because the lie is justified more
easily (Shalvi et al., 2011). To minimize the possibility
that participants decide what to report before they even
roll the die, we amended this paradigm such that the par-
ticipants learned which of their three rolls would be paid
out only just before reporting them.
In the current experiment, participants thus have the op-
portunity to serve self-interest by being dishonest in an
anonymous setting. During this opportunity, we ask them
to perform a concurrent task that imposes either high or
low cognitive load. We argue that under high cognitive
load the main executive function with which the working
memory will be engaged is the concurrent task, thereby
leaving less room to process or manipulate information
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needed to tell a lie (i.e., the ramifications or the fabrica-
tion and justification of the lie, respectively) while at the
same time leaving less room for the monitoring and regu-
lation required to do so (i.e., the assimilation of emotions
or withholding of factual information, respectively). We
therefore expect less dishonesty when under higher cog-
nitive load. Additionally, for those who do have enough
cognitive capacity to lie, we expect dishonesty to occur
only when self-interest can be served, namely when lying
is associated with monetary gain.
2 Method
2.1 Participants and design
A total of 173 participants (117 females, Mage = 21.26,
SD = 2.61) took part in this experiment. Participants were
randomly assigned to either a high cognitive load or a low
cognitive load condition. Participants were paid the out-
come of their first reported die roll in Euros and received
additional money for their performance in other experi-
ments later in the same experimental hour. Sample size
was a result of terminating data collection after one week
(as was decided beforehand). We report all data exclusions
(if any), all manipulations, and all measures in the study.
2.2 Materials and procedure
An experimenter showed the participants how to roll a die
underneath a cup by shaking the cup back and forth, then
told them all to practice rolling the die this way at least
three times. Participants were asked to look through a hole
in the bottom of the cup each time they rolled the die to see
their outcome. They then proceeded individually, using
a computer on their desks separated by partition screens,
while the experimenter remained outside of the view of
the participant in the far front of the room. Participants
read that the study was about multitasking and memory,
and that they would be asked to memorize a string of let-
ters while rolling a six-sided die three times. An example
of a string was given with the same number of letters par-
ticipants would encounter later in the experiment. Partici-
pants were told one of the three rolls — to be randomly as-
signed by the computer at a later time — would be paid out
and that their pay was conditional on their performance on
the memory task. Participants in the high cognitive load
condition memorized a string of eight letters1 (i.e., NWR-
BRKPJ), and participants in the low cognitive load condi-
tion memorized a string of two letters (i.e., KL). In both
conditions participants were given ten seconds to memo-
rize their letter string. They were then first instructed to
1Letters were chosen instead of numbers (see for the manipulation
with numbers Gilbert & Hixon, 1991) to prevent interference with the
numbers seen on the die.
roll the die three times (the screen auto-advanced after 30
seconds), and subsequently they were asked to report all
three outcomes. After this, they were asked to reproduce
their letter string. Importantly, just before reporting the
outcome of the first roll — but after having rolled the die
three times — all participants were told the computer had
decided their first roll would be paid out.
Participants then completed three manipulation check
questions. First, to ensure that participants in the high
load condition were in fact occupied with the letter string,
we asked them to indicate how much they agreed with the
following statement: While rolling the die, I was mainly
thinking of the string I had to remember (scale from 1 = to-
tally disagree to 5 = totally agree). To ensure that any ob-
served differences between the two load conditions would
not be due to participants in the high load condition having
trouble perceiving the outcome of all three rolls, we asked
them whether they agreed with: I took a good look at all
three rolls (scale from 1 = totally disagree to 5 = totally
agree). To make sure any differences observed between
conditions would not be due to participants having trouble
remembering their outcomes, we asked participants to in-
dicate: How many of the rolls did you remember seeing?
(0 = none, 1 = one, 2 = two, 3 = all three rolls). Next,
participants answered one question pertaining their feel-
ings of entitlement to full payment: I feel I have the right
to earn six Euros (slider from 0 = totally disagree to 100
= totally agree). This question enabled us to ensure that
observed differences were not due to varying feelings of
entitlement to payment.
For exploratory reasons, we then presented participants
with emotion items, as being dishonest might cause people
to feel negative emotions, especially when they have no
means of justifying their behavior (Shalvi et al., 2012), or
positive emotions, caused by the thrill of cheating (Ruedy,
Moore, Gino, & Schweitzer, 2013).2 Participants were
probed for suspicion, yet none was aware of the aim of
the study, and demographics were ascertained.
2Four positive items (e.g., “happy”, “content”; α = .87), and sixteen
negative items (e.g. “sad”, “tense”; α = .93; all scales ranging from 0
= not at all, 7 = very much) were randomly presented, and one overall
mood scale (slider from -50 = “very bad”; 50 = “very good”). Due to a
technical failure, five participants’ answers to the mood questions were
not recorded (3 in low load, 2 in high load). Independent-samples t-
tests were conducted to compare the mean of the positive emotion items
between conditions and the mean of the negative emotion items between
conditions. Participants in the low load condition felt more positive emo-
tions (M = 4.94, SD = 1.00) than the participants in the high load con-
dition (M = 4.40, SD = 1.24), t(166) = 3.10, p = .002. For the negative
emotions, there was a marginally significant difference between the low
load condition (M = 1.93, SD = .83) and the high load condition (M =
2.21, SD = 1.12), t(166) = −1.84, p = .07. However, there was no differ-
ence between overall mood between the low load condition (M = 26.13,
SD = 12.98) and the high load condition (M = 22.02, SD = 18.34), t(166)
= 1.67, p = .10. None of the three mood scales correlated with the re-
ported die rolls in the two conditions, all p’s > .23.
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Table 1: Frequency and corresponding percentage (in parentheses) of the reported outcomes of all three die rolls for
both conditions
Reported outcomes of die roll
1 2 3 4 5 6
Roll one Low load 6 (6.98) 6 (6.98) 10 (11.63) 26 (30.23) 15 (17.44) 23 (26.74)
High load 13 (14.94) 10 (11.49) 13 (14.94) 22 (25.29) 20 (22.99) 9 (10.34)
Roll two Low load 13 (15.12) 12 (13.95) 15 (17.44) 17 (19.77) 16 (18.60) 13 (15.12)
High load 9 (10.34) 14 (16.09) 12 (13.79) 24 (27.59) 11 (12.64) 17 (19.54)
Roll three Low load 9 (10.47) 15 (17.44) 10 (11.63) 13 (15.12) 19 (22.09) 20 (23.26)
High load 16 (18.39) 16 (18.39) 7 (8.05) 11 (12.64) 21 (24.14) 16 (18.39)
3 Results
3.1 Manipulation check
We did separate independent-samples t-test with condition
as independent and the manipulation check questions as
dependent variables. These analyses indicated that par-
ticipants in the high load condition were thinking of their
string of letters more (M = 3.97, SD = 1.60) than partic-
ipants in the low load condition (M = 2.79, SD = 1.50),
t(171) = −4.97, p < .001.3 There was no difference in
how good a look participants had at their three rolls be-
tween the high load (M = 4.68, SD = 0.69) and the low
load condition (M = 4.79, SD = 0.49), t(154.86) = 1.24, p
= .22. Almost all participants in both the high load con-
dition (M = 2.95, SD = 0.21) and the low load condition
(M = 2.98, SD = 0.22) remembered seeing all three rolls.
This memory did not differ between the conditions, t(171)
= 0.70, p = .48. Participants in the high load condition did
not feel significantly more entitled to full pay (M = 73.22,
SD = 29.28) than participants in the low load condition (M
= 70.16, SD = 29.05), t(171) = −0.69, p = .49. These re-
sults indicate that our manipulations worked as intended.
Additionally, the time participants took to submit the page
on which they reported the outcome of their first die roll
did not differ between the low load condition (M = 7.41,
SD = 3.81) and the high load condition (M = 7.23, SD =
4.31), t(171) = 0.28, p = .78.
3Although all participants in the low load condition remembered their
letter string correctly, only 58.6 % of participants in the high load con-
dition were able to remember their eight letters correctly and in the right
order, indicating this task was indeed cognitively taxing. 37.9 % got 6 or
more letters correct, but the letters were not in correct order. 3.4 % got
5 or less letters correct. Distributions of the three reported outcomes of
these participants that did not get the letter string correct in the high load
were not significantly different from uniform, all ps > .38, meaning their
results did not deviate from our main findings.
Figure 1: Proportion of the reported outcome of the first
die roll by cognitive load. Bars represent the proportion of
participants who reported having outcome one through six
on the roll that determined pay, for low (blue) and high
(yellow) cognitive load conditions. The horizontal line
represents the proportion of each of the outcomes of a fair
die roll according to chance (.16667 for each outcome).


















3.2 Distribution of reported outcomes
Table 1 shows the frequencies of reported outcomes for
each possible outcome of a six-sided die. We tested
whether the reported outcomes in both conditions differed
from a uniform distribution with a chi-square test in order
to examine whether the reported rolls resemble a distribu-
tion that can be expected by chance (i.e., a fair distribu-
tion). In the high load condition, the distribution of the
first die roll — the roll that was going to be paid out —
was almost significantly different from a uniform distri-
bution, due to a tendency for the number 4 to be over re-
ported, χ2(5, N = 87) = 9.76, p = .08. The second roll did
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not differ significantly from a uniform distribution either,
χ
2(5, N = 87) = 10.03, p = .07 (if anything, this small ef-
fect was also caused by four being the most reported roll,
see Table 1), nor did the third roll, χ2(5, N = 87) = 8.10,
p = .15. In the low load condition, however, the reported
outcomes for the first die roll did differ from a uniform
distribution, χ2(5, N = 86) = 25.77, p < .001, indicating
dishonest reporting of the to be paid out roll (see Figure 1).
The second and third rolls did not differ significantly from
a uniform distribution in the low load condition, χ2(5, N
= 86) = 1.35, p = .93 and χ2(5, N = 86) = 7.21, p = .21
respectively.
Importantly, the average reported outcome of the first
roll of the die was higher in the low load condition (M =
4.24, SD = 1.49) than the high load condition (M = 3.60,
SD = 1.57), Mann-Whitney Z = −2.61, p = .009, indicat-
ing that participants in the low load condition lied to get a
higher pay. As hypothesized, for the second roll, the out-
come in the low load (M = 3.58, SD = 1.66) and the high
load (M = 3.75, SD = 1.61), did not differ, Mann-Whitney
Z = −0.63, p = .53. Similarly, the outcome of the third roll
did not differ between the low load (M = 3.91, SD = 1.71)
and the high load (M = 3.61, SD = 1.81), Mann-Whitney
Z = −1.01, p = .27.
4 Discussion
The current study tested whether having limited cognitive
capacity impairs ones ability to lie. We found considerable
lying when cognitive capacity was not limited, but no de-
tectable lying when cognitive capacity was limited. This
pattern of deception — lying when cognitive processing
was possible and being honest when it was not — was ob-
served only for the outcome of the die roll that had finan-
cial consequences. This suggests that when enough cogni-
tive capacity is available and people can serve self-interest
by being dishonest, they will often do so. Yet without this
cognitive capacity, people are honest regardless of the fact
that self-interest could have been served.
In anonymous situations, not unlike the one we cre-
ated in the current experiment, cognitive control might be
needed to override self-serving biases. We argue, how-
ever, that a certain amount of cognitive processing might
also already be in place to shape the bias itself. Comparing
our results with findings by Valdesolo and Desteno (2008),
it could be argued that, in both studies, imposing cognitive
load led to a diminished capacity to serve the self. In other
words, although people have an automatic tendency to be
self-serving, this automatic reaction requires some men-
tal processing still. A parallel can be drawn with research
on stereotyping, where cognitive load is found to make the
activation of a stereotype less likely to occur; yet when the
stereotype is already activated, cognitive load increases its
usage (Gilbert & Hixon, 1991). These findings suggest
that, although the activation of a stereotype is fairly auto-
matic, to be able to activate the information some cogni-
tive resources are still required.
Our findings are in line with several other lines of re-
search that invoke a dual-process framework. For instance,
activating an intuitive mindset, in contrast to deliberative
mindset, can lead people to deceive less (Zhong, 2011).
Likewise, in a recent paper, it was agued that people are in-
tuitively cooperative, for those who decide quickly (either
by instruction or on their own) and those who are induced
to rely on their intuition, contribute and cooperate more in
economic games (Rand, Greene, & Nowak, 2012, but see
Tinghög et al., 2013, for a different perspective on the time
pressure data). Next to this, people who have a generally
preferred thinking style of relying on their intuition may
be more inclined to show sharing behavior and altruis-
tic punishment (Kinunnen & Windmann, 2013). Another
corresponding notion is that working memory is indirectly
related to dishonesty through the ability to be creative in
finding justifications for this dishonesty, as working mem-
ory relates positively with creative performance (De Dreu,
Nijstad, Baas, Wolsink, & Roskes, 2012) and creative peo-
ple have been found to cheat more (Gino & Ariely, 2012).
Contrary to our findings however, a recent experiment
utilizing a variation of the paradigm used in the cur-
rent study observed more dishonesty under time pressure
(Shalvi et al., 2012). This contradiction is surprising, be-
cause time pressure and cognitive load have often been
used interchangeably, namely to lay bare an automatic
process. One possible reason for these deviating findings
could be that our procedure was adjusted such that par-
ticipants’ opportunity to justify any lies beforehand was
kept to a minimum. Namely, only after rolling the die
three times were participants in the current study informed
about which of their die rolls would earn them money.
In the procedure utilized by Shalvi and colleagues (2012)
participants knew that the one roll they were going to re-
port was for money even before being under time pressure.
Similar to the argument made by Shalvi and colleagues
(2012), others have found that being forced to contem-
plate for 3 minutes about the decision to lie decreased de-
ception, as compared to an immediate choice that had to
be made within 30 seconds (Gunia et al., 2012). What
remains unclear however, is whether in these cases the
immediacy with which the decision had to be made was
pressing enough to stop any justification or rationalization,
which arguably could have already taken place while ap-
prehending the nature of the task.
Another difference between our cognitive load manip-
ulation and the aforementioned time pressure manipula-
tion is that our participants had two concurrent demands
on cognitive capacity instead of having one task demand-
ing immediate capacity. This difference could have led
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participants under time pressure — contrary to those un-
der cognitive load — to have just enough cognitive capac-
ity to generate an untruthful response. In that case, even
though time pressure will make observing the product of
automatic processing more likely because further process-
ing (i.e., deliberation) is not possible, some processes like
self-serving biases or relying on heuristics might still oc-
cur under time pressure. These processes may happen ex-
traordinary fast and mostly outside of conscious awareness
and can therefore arguably be considered part of the auto-
matic response. As Balcetis and Dunning (2006) showed,
people readily see what they are motivated to see. People
may be unaware of self-serving biases because these bi-
ases operate outside of conscious awareness. The possibil-
ity that under time-pressure self-serving biases are present
but under cognitive load they are not is currently insuffi-
ciently founded. It does, however, open up an opportunity
for further research to explore what processes make up the
automatic part of the dual system. As has been argued be-
fore, both systems involve cognition in the sense of infor-
mation processing (Cushman, 2013). The question, then,
is not what the automatic tendency is during (dis-)honesty
junctures, as both lying and being honest can be automatic,
but what processes contribute to the automaticity of the
given tendencies.
Although a body of research presumes lying is a delib-
erate act, an indication that a process takes up cognitive
capacity — such as found here — does not necessarily
entail that this process is not also somewhat automatic.
The process of reporting the truth might just be one that
is relatively less prone to interference by simultaneous de-
mand on cognitive capacity than the self-serving bias that
so often comes on top of it. The current study therefore
calls for further empirical clarification on the different ef-
fects of manipulations such as time pressure and cogni-
tive load, but also on their differences with for example
depletion of self-control resources. This manipulation is
known to increase cheating (e.g., Mead, Baumeister, Gino,
Schweitzer, & Ariely, 2009), a result possibly due to not
having enough executive resources to identify an act as
moral or immoral (Gino, Schweitzer, Mead, & Ariely,
2011). However, studies that did not focus on cheating
but instead focused on lying found lying was not affected
by depletion (Debey, Verschuere, & Crombez, 2012). In
light of the abovementioned findings, it thus seems that al-
though serving self-interest is usually fairly easy, lying is
not.
5 Conclusion
To understand unethical behavior, we need to study the
prerequisites for such dishonest behavior to take place.
The current study suggests that one of those prerequisites
is having ample cognitive capacity. On the societal level,
a moral basis that pulls people’s behavior away from pure
self-interest is indispensible. Although individuals are of-
ten found to act in their own interest, and lying is often
done out of self-interest, solely on the basis of this it would
be unwise to conclude that being deceptive is the default:
The current study shows that sometimes telling the truth is
the easiest option in terms of cognitive processing and that
telling a lie takes at least some additional mental effort.
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